CMIST hosts Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann, presents lecture on nuclear latency

by Sage Rohrbach and Varsha Gaddam

Last Wednesday, Dr. Matthew Furhmann spoke about his recent book, “The New Logic of Nuclear Deterrence.” **Elliot Liermann/** Staff Photographer

Hosted by the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology (CMIST), Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann spoke about his most recent book, “The New Logic of Nuclear Deterrence,” at a lecture and discussion last Wednesday.

Matthew Fuhrmann is the Cullen-McFadden professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University and has been a visiting professor at Yale University, a visiting associate professor at Stanford University, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a research fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He also holds the title of Andrew Carnegie Fellow, awarded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Fuhrmann’s interests center around dual-use technologies — technologies that may be used for either peaceful or militaristic purposes. The topic of his recent lecture, “The New Logic of Nuclear Deterrence,” highlights a specific type of dual-use technology: nuclear power.

During the discussion, Fuhrmann explored the political implications of “nuclear latency,” a term used to describe regions that have the capability to quickly create nuclear weapons despite not currently possessing them. The possibility of nuclear weaponry, he argues, may present an equal, if not more influential threat than actually possessing such weaponry. This is because a nuclear-latent country threatening to create a nuclear weapon enables them to gain political leverage while dodging the repercussions faced by countries actually possessing such weapons.

Although nuclear latency can be a strategic method for gaining political influence and international leverage, Fuhrmann explains that in order to be effective, this strategy must be implemented thoughtfully. Specifically, he highlights three main problems with the approach and conjectures three corresponding solutions.

First, he explained that the threat of building nuclear weapons lacks immediate punishment, as it takes time to implement such weaponry. Thus, for regions to use the threat appropriately, he argues that they must be very close to creating the weapons.

Second, nuclear weapons have a high implementation and proliferation cost, which can lead to aggressors questioning the credibility of nuclear threats. To mitigate this issue and assert their authority, Fuhrmann resolves that countries’ threats should only be made in high-stakes situations in which a nuclear threat may seem reasonably plausible.

Third, he called attention to the problem that attempting this strategy can incite instability, as aggressors may preemptively attack at the threat of creating nuclear weapons. To address this issue, Fuhrmann suggests that nuclear-latent countries ensure they make clear that their intentions are peaceful. When other regions view nuclear possession as a restrained process rather than an active implementation, they are likely to hold off on aggressing and instead display a more accommodating foreign policy toward their nuclear-latent rivals.

Having identified 250 sites in 33 different countries currently working on nuclear power, Fuhrmann encourages the audience to consider how these countries’ nuclear latency will continue to shape international politics. He also prompts the audience to consider how the same strategies involved with nuclear power could operate for dual-use technologies broadly, ending with the example of artificial intelligence. At Carnegie Mellon, a leading institution for AI, he reiterates that the costs and benefits of emerging technologies must be weighed, pondering how novel mechanisms can be used in both peaceful and violent manners.